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Comments

Federalizing "Unfair Business Practice"
Claims under California's Unfair
Competition Law
Alexander N. Crosst

INTRODUCTION
Since Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act'
("FTC Act" or "the Act"), states have passed "Little FTC Acts" to
broaden antitrust and consumer protections against "unfair
competition." On the one hand, unfair competition laws are
important shields for consumers against unscrupulous business
practices that impair competition and consumer welfare. On the
other hand, their expansive and unpredictable reach threatens
legitimate businesses, unaware of the laws' boundaries.
California's "Little FTC Act" is its Unfair Competition Law
(UCL). The UCL prohibits unfair competition, which includes
unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices. 2 While the

t BA 2011, The Pennsylvania State University; JD Candidate 2014, The University
of Chicago Law School.
1 Pub L No 109-455, 38 Stat 717, 719 (1914), codified at 15 USC § 45 (establishing
that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful").
2
Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17200 (West 2008).
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California legislature intended the UCL's prohibition of "unfair
business practices" to increase consumer protections, the UCL
has also led to abusive litigation and unpredictable liability for
California businesses. The California Courts of Appeal initially
applied very broad, vague definitions of "unfair business
practices," prompting widespread complaints from California
businesses that it was unclear what practices the UCL permits
and forbids. 3 Recognizing these administrative and compliance
problems, the California Supreme Court rejected these vague
unfairness standards in competitor actions.4 The California
Supreme Court then outlined a revised test, more strictly rooted
in antitrust law, for unfair practice claims brought by
competitors.5 But because the California Supreme Court
expressly excluded consumer actions from this new definition of
"unfair business practices," uncertainty over the UCL's reach
remains. As a result, the California Courts of Appeal are split
over the appropriate definition of "unfair business practices" for
consumer actions. 6
To date, the California Supreme Court has not resolved the
lower courts' split. Absent a conclusive ruling, California Courts
of Appeal have used three different definitions of "unfair
business acts" for consumer suits. The first approach continues
to apply the definitions rejected by the California Supreme
Court in competitor cases.' The second approach extends the
new definition in competitor cases to consumer cases. 8 The third
approach adopts the definition from § 5 of the federal FTC Act.9
The conflict over the appropriate definition of "unfair
business practices" in consumer suits illustrates important

3 See, for example, Cooley LLP, Proposition 64: A Major Change in the Unfair
Competition Law (Cooley LLP Nov 17, 2004), online at http://www.cooley.com/57765
(visited Sept 15, 2013) (writing that "the permissive standards of the UCL gave rise to
legions of lawsuits that were perceived to be frivolous and motivated by considerations
other than consumer protection").
See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc v Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co, 973 P2d
527, 542-43 (Cal 1999).
Id at 543-44.
6 Compare Gregory v Albertson's, Inc, 104 Cal App 4th 845, 853-54 (2002), with
South Bay Chevrolet v General Motors Acceptance Corp, 72 Cal App 4th 861, 886 (1999)
and Camacho v Auto Club of Southern California, 142 Cal App 4th 1394, 1403-04 (2006).
See, for example, Smith a State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 93 Cal
App 4th 700, 720 n 23 (2001).
See, for example, Gregory, 104 Cal App 4th at 853-54.
See, for example, Camacho, 142 Cal App 4th at 1403-04.

489]

FEDERALIZING UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICE CLAIMS

491

themes in consumer protection and state law issues. First, the
issue demonstrates that judicial efforts to create a flexible
consumer protection standard conflict with the goal of
maintaining a predictable liability regime for businesses.
Second, since the California legislature modeled the UCL after
the federal FTC Act, the conflict shows the interactions between
state and federal antitrust and consumer protection laws. Third,
the split offers greater insights into how other states should
interpret their similarly constructed unfair competition laws.
Fourth, the issue has significant economic implications because
California has the largest economy among the states, which
makes its law influential, and civil litigation affects the state's
business environment.1 0
In this Comment, I analyze the unfair business practice
claims under California's UCL. Following this introduction, this
Comment has three major parts. In the Part I, I describe the
evolution of federal and state unfair competition law. In Part II,
I give a general description of the UCL's history, purpose, and
substance. After this statutory overview, I also review California
courts' treatment of "unfair business practices." In Part III, I
argue that the § 5 test from the FTC Act is the best of the three
available definitions." First, I consider the two alternative
approaches and reject them as significantly flawed. Second, I
address the strengths and weaknesses of the § 5 approach to
demonstrate it is the better standard. I conclude with a brief
summary of my argument in favor of the FTC § 5 definition of
"unfair business practices."
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL AND STATE UNFAIR
COMPETITION LAWS

In this Part, I outline the development of federal and state
unfair competition laws to place California's UCL in context of
the national consumer protection framework. First, I detail the
development of the federal definition of unfairness under the

'0 See Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy (CCSCE), 2011
California Economy Rankings (CCSCE Numbers in the News Sept 2012), online at
http://www.cesce.com/PDF/Numbers-Sept-2012-CA-Economy-Rankings-2011.pdf (visited
Sept 15, 2013) (noting that California's economy ranks eleventh in the world).
" As discussed in Part III, I refer to the "§ 5 test," not to be confused with the
rejected Cigarette Rule.
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FTC Act. Second, I evaluate the unfair competition laws of
several states.
A.

Overview of the FTC Act

In 1914, Congress passed the FTC Act as one of its first
forays into consumer protection. 12 Yet, the original purpose of
the FTC Act was not to advance consumer protection policy;
rather, it sought to prevent unscrupulous business practices
from harming the regular flow of commerce. 13 The Supreme
Court recognized the FTC Act's limited scope in a 1931 decision
holding that the Act's proscribed unfair trade methods were "not
per se unfair methods of competition."14 In 1938, however,
Congress amended the FTC Act through the Wheeler-Lea Act to
categorically prohibit unfair acts and practices affecting
individual consumers.1 5 With this amendment, Congress created
the current consumer-oriented statute. But in spite of this new
focus, Congress declined to grant consumers a private right of
action out of concerns that such a right would spawn abusive
litigation. 16
Between 1938 and 1964, commentators criticized the FTC's
investigations as expansive and unpredictable.1 7 To quell the
seemingly inevitable political backlash, the FTC published a
policy statement establishing a new standard for commercial
fairness. This rule, called the "Cigarette Rule," provided three
criteria for determining if a practice was unfair: (1) whether the
act "offends public policy as it has been established by statutes,
See Pub L No 109-455, 38 Stat 717, 719 (1914), codified at 15 USC § 45(a)(1);
Ryan P. O'Quinn and Thomas Watterson, Note, Fair is Fair-ReshapingAlaska's Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 28 Alaska L Rev 295, 298-300 (2011)
(describing the development of the FTC Act).
13 See Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of "UnfairActs or Practices"in Section 5 of the
FederalTrade Commission Act, 70 Georgetown L J 225, 226 (1981).
" Federal Trade Commission v Raladam Co, 283 US 643, 649 (1931).
15 See Federal Trade Commission (Wheeler-Lea) Amendments
of 1938, Pub L No
75-447, 52 Stat 111, 111, codified at 15 USC § 45(a)(1); Matthew W. Sawchak and Kip D.
Nelson, Defining Unfairness in "UnfairTrade Practices",90 NC L Rev 2033, 2057 (2012).
16 O'Quinn and Watterson, 28 Alaska L Rev at 300 & n 30
(cited in note 12)
(explaining that a proposed amendment to the FTC Act would have given a private right
of action to those harmed by the Act's violation).
17 Averitt, 70 Georgetown L J at 226-27 (cited in note
13) (discussing the
"unstructured" nature of the FTC Act's general prohibition of "unfair competition" and
the FTC's original enforcement methods). See also Sawchak and Nelson, 90 NC L Rev at
2057-82 (cited in note 15) (tracing the development and critical reception of the FTC
Act).
12
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the common law, statutory, or other established concept of
unfairness"; (2) whether the act "is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous"; and (3) whether the act "causes
substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other
businessmen)."1 8
In Federal Trade Commission v Sperry and Hutchinson
Co,1 9 the Supreme Court made a limited endorsement of the
Cigarette Rule.2 0 Citing the FTC's duty to protect both
consumers and competition, the Sperry Court held that § 5 of the
FTC Act allowed the Commission to prohibit unfair or deceptive
practices regardless of their competitive effects. 21 The Court
then quoted the Cigarette Rule in dicta as an example of the
FTC's authority to regulate unfair practices. 22
After Sperry, the FTC asserted its regulatory authority over
a broad range of behavior, leading to another critical backlash
that it had overreached its authority. 23 The FTC again
responded with a revised policy statement, rejecting findings of
unfairness based solely on the Cigarette Rule criteria of
"immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous" conduct. 24 To
replace the Cigarette Rule, the new policy statement provided a
three-element test focusing on "unjustified, substantial
consumer injury" as the principle feature of unfair practices. 25
18 Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation
Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the
Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed Reg 8355 (1964). The rule got its name from its
original purpose of governing the advertisements and sales of cigarettes.
1s 405 US 233 (1972).
20 See id at 244. See also Sawchak and Nelson, 90 NC L Rev
at 2082 n 138 (cited in
note 15), comparing Spiegel, Inc v Federal Trade Commission, 540 F2d 287, 293 n 8 (7th
Cir 1976) (explaining that footnote 5 in Sperry "approved" the Cigarette Rule), with
David A. Rice, Consumer Unfairness at the FTC: Misadventures in Law and Economics,
52 Geo Wash L Rev 1, 25-26 (1984) (arguing that footnote 5 was not a substantive
endorsement of the Cigarette Rule).
21
See id.
22 Id at 244
n 5.
23 See, for example, The FTC as National Nanny, Wash Post A22 (Mar
1, 1978)
(criticizing the FTC's proposal to ban or heavily regulate television advertisements of
sugar products to children because it is "not a proper role of government" to "protect"
children from eating too much sugar).
24 The policy statement was included as part of a letter from the Federal Trade
Commission to Senators Wendell H. Ford and John C. Danforth (Dec 17, 1980), reprinted
in InternationalHarvester Co, 104 FTC 949, 1070-76 (1984). See also Jean Braucher,
Defining Unfairness:Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission,
68 BU L Rev 349, 408-12 (1988) (describing the development of the revised § 5 VFC test
of unfairness as a response to attacks by Reagan conservatives).
25 See InternationalHarvester Co, 104 FTC at 1044, 1073 (discussing
and reprinting
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This revised " 5 test" has three elements: (1) the consumer
injury must be substantial; (2) "not outweighed by any offsetting
consumer or competitive benefits that the sales practice also
produces"; and (3) of a nature "that consumers themselves could
not reasonably have avoided." 26 This third element advances the
FTC's view that it should only bring unfair practice claims to
"halt some form of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or
takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of consumer
decisionmaking."27
Through these three elements, the § 5 test elevated the
importance of unjustified consumer injury over the other
Cigarette Rule criteria. 28 First, the FTC reasoned that the
Cigarette Rule's public policy factor simply serves to confirm
whether a practice causes consumer injury; and, without being
clear and well-established, the policy alone would not establish
unfairness. 29 Second, the FTC discarded the Cigarette Rule's
consideration of whether the conduct is "immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous," as "largely duplicative." 30 In 1994,
Congress amended the FTC Act to incorporate the revised § 5
test.31
Although the § 5 test gives courts more analytical guidance
in determining unfairness (at least compared to the Cigarette
Rule), critics complain it still has undesirable results. 32 For
example, Robert Bork and Alexander Bickel have argued that
Congress should withdraw the FTC's power to label practices as
"unfair competition" because agencies should not have unlimited
power to "legislate."33 Further, Jean Braucher claims the § 5 test
the FIC's 1980 policy statement).
26 Id at 1061 (discussing the essential elements
from the policy statement).
27 Id at 1074. See also Braucher, 68 BU L Rev at 412 (cited
in note 24) (describing
how the FTC's explanation evidenced its primary concern with seller fault).
28 See Braucher, 68 BU L Rev at
408 (cited in note 24).
29 InternationalHarvester Co, 104 FTC at 1074-76
(cited in note 24).
30

Id at 1076.

Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub L No 103-312, 108 Stat
1691, 1695 (1994), codified at 15 USC § 45(n).
32 See, for example, Braucher, 68 BU L Rev at 412 (cited in note 24)
(noting that
although the § 5 test created uncertainty through its cost-benefit analysis and a
potential for a "consumer-beware" approach, the FTC later allayed these concerns, at
least in consumer credit cases, by passing the Credit Practice Rule).
3 See id at 350 n 7, citing Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, Unfairness: Views of Unfair Acts and Practices in Violation of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 17, 21 (1980) (excerpting testimony
by Robert H. Bork and Alexander M. Bickel arguing for withdrawal of the unfairness
3'
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does not establish clear behavioral standards and, consequently,
the FTC should only target gross market inefficiencies, not
individual consumer harms. 34
B.

Overview of State Unfair Competition Laws
1.

Creation of state unfair competition laws.

State unfair competition laws generally advance three
policies: 1) correcting an imbalance of market power between
buyers and sellers; 2) making litigation of small claims
economical; and 3) deterring unfair competition by allowing
private plaintiffs to sue. 35 States began to enact "Little FTC
Acts" in the wake of public anxiety over reports by Ralph Nader
and the American Bar Association about the FTC's ineffective
consumer protection efforts. 36 Public pressure on state
governments also increased because of the perceived increasing
complexity of consumer transactions. 37 To address the problems
hindering the FTC's consumer protection efforts-scarce
resources, limited staff, and increasing numbers of claims-the
states gradually created private rights of action for individual
consumers.38

When
used three
Protection
FTC and
Suggested

enacting unfair competition laws, states generally
versions of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Law ("UTP/CPL"),3 9 a model statute written by the
the Council of State Governments' Committee on
State Legislation. 40 The first version, patterned on

power from the FTC on the ground that "as a matter of sound public policy, Congress
ought not delegate to agencies unfettered power to legislate").
3
Braucher, 68 BU L Rev at 351 (cited in note 24).
*' See Harvard Law Review, Note, Toward Greater Equality in Business
Transactions:A Proposal to Extend the Little FTC Acts to Small Businesses, 96 Harv L
Rev 1621, 1625-26 (1983). See also Henry N. Butler and Jason S. Johnston, Reforming
State Consumer ProtectionLiability: An Economic Approach, 2010 Colum Bus L Rev 1, 1
(2010).
S36 See O'Quinn and Watterson, 28 Alaska L Rev at 300-03 (cited in note 12)
(describing the emergence of the "Little FTC Acts" and the consumer protection
movement).
3 See Edward M. Crane, Nicholas J. Eichenseer, and Emma S. Glazer, U.S.
Consumer ProtectionLaw: A FederalistPatchwork, 78 Def Couns J 305, 326 (2011).
3 O'Quinn and Watterson, 28 Alaska L Rev at 302 (cited in note 12). Initially, the
FTC and state attorneys general were the only parties who could bring actions. Id.
39 Id at 301, citing Model Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
(Council of State Governments 1970).
40 O'Quinn and Watterson, 28 Alaska L Rev at 301 (cited in note
12). There were
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the federal FTC Act, bans all "unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade
or commerce." 41 The second version prohibits "false, misleading,
or deceptive methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."42
California and fifteen other states have enacted a form of this
second version. 43 The third version prohibits twelve specific
practices and includes a catch-all provision proscribing "any act
or practice which is unfair or deceptive to the consumer."44 On
the whole, the model statute was very popular among the states.
By 1973, forty-four states had passed some version of the model
statute. 45
Consumer remedies under state unfair competition laws
differ significantly from the FTC Act. 4 6 Most notably, state
three versions of the model statute to help states to incorporate the statute into existing
state codes. Id.
41 Id. Fourteen states have adopted the first version of the UTP/CPL: Connecticut,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. See generally Conn
Gen Stat Ann § 42-110a et seq; Fla Stat Ann § 501.201 et seq; Hawaii Rev Stat § 480-2;
215 ILCS 5/423 et seq; La Rev Stat Ann 51:1401 et seq; 5 Me Rev Stat Ann § 205-A et
seq; Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 93A, §§ 1-11; Mont Ann Code § 30-14-101 et seq; Neb Rev
Stat §59-1601 et seq; NC Gen Stat § 75-1.1; SC Code Ann § 39-5-10 et seq; 9 Vt Stat Ann
§§ 2451-2462; Wash Rev Code Ann § 19.86.010 et seq; and W Va Code § 46A-6-101 et
seq, collected in Jonathan Sheldon and Carolyn L. Carter, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and
Practices, 132 & n 162 (6th ed 2004).
42 O'Quinn and Watterson, 28 Alaska L Rev at 301 (cited in note 12).
13 These other states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, and North
Dakota. See Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining in Abuse
by Requiring Plaintiffs to Allege Reliance as an EssentialElement, 43 Harv J on Legis 1,
17 n 123 (2006), citing Federal Trade Commission, Fact Sheet: State Legislation to
Combat Unfair Trade Practices (1973). However, since this second version was limited to
fraud and did not originally cover "unfair practices," no state currently uses this exact
form of the UTP/CPL. Scheuerman, 43 Harv J on Legis at 17 n 123. See, for example, Cal
Bus & Prof Code § 17200 (West 2008) (defining "unfair competition" to include "unfair"
acts).
44 O'Quinn and Watterson, 28 Alaska L Rev at 301 (cited in note 12). With some
variation in the list of specifically prohibited acts, eight states have enacted this version.
See generally Alaska Stat Ann § 45.50.471 et seq; Ga Code Ann § 10-1-390 et seq; Md
Com Law Code §§ 13-101; Miss Code § 75-24-1 et seq; NH Rev Stat Ann § 358-A:1 et seq;
73 Pa Stat § 201-1 et seq; RI Gen Laws § 6-13.1 et seq; Tenn Code Ann § 47-18-101 et
seq.
4
Scheuerman, 43 Harv J on Legis at 17 (cited in note 43), citing Federal Trade
Commission, Fact Sheet (cited in note 43).
4
See Henry N. Butler and Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer ProtectionActs
Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 Fla L Rev 163, 173-76 (2011) (explaining that the states
"provide a private right of action, different remedies, and relaxed common law
limitations on consumer protection actions when compared to FTC policy standards").
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unfair competition laws give consumers a private right of action
specific to unfair competition. 47 The federal FTC Act, by
contrast, leaves consumers with only private actions under
common law fraud or breach of contract. 48 This is important
because private litigants do not face the political pressures
applicable to the FTC and, accordingly, can bring smaller cases
that would otherwise escape the FTC's attention. 49 Therefore,
the private right of action in state law enhances the deterrence
power of consumer protection law.50
2.

State approaches in defining unfair business practices.

Although most states have unfair competition laws, the
states define unfairness differently.5' Twenty-eight states have
unfair competition laws like California's UCL that generally
prohibit "unfair . . . acts or practices" without providing further

guidance to the courts. 52 Fourteen of these twenty-eight states
continue to use the outdated Cigarette Rule standard of
unfairness. 53
Id.
O'Quinn and Watterson, 28 Alaska L Rev at 300 (cited in note 12).
49 See Butler and Wright, 63 Fla L Rev at 165 (cited in note 46).
50 See Harvard Law Review, Note, 96 Harv L Rev at 1626 (cited in note 35).
s' See generally Alan S. Brown and Larry E. Hepler, Comparison of Consumer
Fraud Statutes Across the Fifty States, 55 Fed'n Def & Corp Couns Q 263, 266 (2005).
52
See David L. Belt, The Standard for Determining "Unfair Acts or Practices"
Under State Unfair Trade Practices Acts, 80 Conn Bar J 247, 249 n 2 (2006), citing
Alaska Stat Ann § 45.50.471 (LexisNexis 2006) (providing a non-exclusive list of "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices"); Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17200 (West 2008); Conn Gen Stat
§ 42-110b(a) (2006); Fla Stat Ann § 501.204(1) (West 2006); Ga Code Ann § 10-1-393(a)
(LexisNexis 2006); Hawaii Rev Stat Ann § 480-2(a) (LexisNexis 2006); 815 ILCS 505/2
(West 2006); Iowa Code Ann § 714.16.2.a (West 2006); La Rev Stat Ann § 1427 (West
2006); 5 Me Rev Stat Ann § 207 (West 2006); Md Comm Law Code Ann § 13-301 (West
2006); Mass Gen Laws Ann Ch 93a, §2(a) (West 2006); Miss Code Ann § 75-24-5(1)
(2006); Mo Ann Stat § 407.020.1 (West 2006); Mont Code Ann § 30-14-103 (2006); Neb
Rev Stat Ann § 59-1602 (LexisNexis 2006); NH Rev Stat Ann § 358-A:2 (2006); NC Gen
Stat § 75-1.1(a) (2006); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 1345.02(a) (West 2006); Okla Stat Ann
§ 15-753.20 (West 2006); 10 Puerto Rico Laws Ann § 259(a) (2006); RI Gen Laws § 613.1-1 et seq (2006); SC Code Ann § 39-5-20(a) (West 2006); Tenn Code Ann § 47-18104(a) (2006); 9 Vt Stat Ann § 2453(a) (2006); Wash Rev Code Ann § 19.86.010 (West
2006); W Va Code Ann § 46a-6-104 (LexisNexis 2006); Wis Stat Ann § 100.20 (West
2006); and Wyo Stat Ann § 40-12-105 (LexisNexis 2006). Belt adds that "although the
Maryland statute enumerates a list of practices that are unfair or deceptive, the list has
been said to be nonexclusive." Belt, 80 Conn Bar J at 249 n 2, citing Golt v Phillips, 517
A2d 328, 331-32 (Md 1986).
5
See Belt, 80 Conn Bar J at 303-04 & n 322 (cited in note 52), citing Alaska v
O'Neil Investigations, Inc, 609 P2d 520, 535 (Alaska 1980); PNR, Inc v Beacon Property
Management, Inc, 842 So2d 773, 777 (Fla 2003); Samuels v King Motor Co of Fort
4
4
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The remaining fourteen of the twenty-eight states have
varied definitions of unfair practices. Some states, like
California, use several definitions.54 Four states endorse a
standard similar to the FTC § 5 test.65 And while most other
states claim they follow statutory or judicial directives to refer to
interpretations of § 5 of the FTC Act, they actually follow
Cigarette Rule articulations of unfairness.56
Lauderdale, 782 So2d 489 (Fla Dist Ct App 2001); Hawaii Community Federal Credit
Union v Keka, 11 P3d 1, 17 (Hawaii 2000); Robinson v Toyota Motor Credit Corp, 775
NE2d 951, 889 (111 2002); Jefferson v Chevron USA, Inc, 713 So2d 785 (La Ct App 1998);
A&W Sheet Metal, Inc v Berg Mechanical, Inc, 653 So2d 158, 164 (La Ct App 1995);
Morrison v Toys "R" Us, Inc, 806 NE2d 388, 392 (Mass 2004); Heller Financial v
Insurance Co of North America, 573 NE2d 8, 12-13 (Mass 1991); PMP Associates, Inc v
Globe Newspaper Co, 321 NE2d 915, 917-18 (Mass 1975); Milford Lumber Co v RCB
Realty, Inc, 780 A2d 1259, 1263 (NH 2001); Johnson v Beverly-Hanks & Associates, 400
SE 2d 38,42 (NC 1991); McInerney v Pinehurst Area Realty, Inc, 590 SE 2d 313, 316 (NC
Ct App 2004); Ames v Oceanside Welding and Towing Co, 767 A2d 677, 681 (RI 2001);
Christie v Dalmig, Inc, 396 A2d 1385, 1387-88 (Vt 1979); Blake v Federal Way Cycle
Center, 698 P2d 578, 583 (Wash Ct App 1985); Preview Properties,Inc v Landis, 130
Wash App 1050 (2005). But see Belt, 80 Conn Bar J at 303-04 n 322 (cited in note 52),
citing United Companies Lending Corp v Sargeant, 20 F Supp 2d 192, 200-04 (D Mass
1998) (applying the FTC's Unfairness Policy Statement in upholding a regulation
promulgated by the Massachusetts Attorney General). Among these fourteen states, only
two expressly allow findings of unfairness based on only one criteria of the Cigarette
Rule. Belt, 80 Conn Bar J at 309 (cited in note 52), citing Robinson v Toyota Motor Credit
Corp, 775 NE2d 951, 961 (Ill 2002) (holding that a plaintiff does not need to establish all
three Cigarette Rule criteria to state a valid unfairness claim) and Cheshire Mortgage
Service, Inc v Montes, 223 Conn 80, 106 (1992) (same). Two of these states require the
plaintiff to establish two of the three Cigarette Rule criteria, finding unfair business
practices when (1) the practice violates an established public policy; and (2) it is either
immoral, unethical, or unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers. See Belt,
80 Conn Bar J at 309-10 (cited in note 52), citing Samuels v King Motor Co of Fort
Lauderdale, 782 So 2d 489, 499 (Fla Dist Ct App 2001) and Hawaii Community Federal
Credit Union v Keka, 11 P3d 1, 16 (Hawaii 2000) (emphasis added). Finally, one state
requires the consumer to prove substantial injury along with one of either of the other
two Cigarette Rule criteria. See Belt, 80 Conn Bar J at 310 (cited in note 52), citing Mo
Code State Regs § 60-8.020.
* See, for example, Belt, 80 Conn Bar J at 308 (cited in note 52).
5s See id at 306 n 334 (cited in note 52), citing Legg v Castruccio, 642 A2d 906, 91417 (Md Ct Spec App 1994) (citing FTC's 1980 Policy Statement); Maine v Weinschenk,
868 A2d 200, 206 (Me 2005) (citing the amended FTC Act); Tungate v MacLean-Stevens
Studios, Inc, 714 A2d 792, 797 (Me 1998) (same); Seminski v Maine Appliance
Warehouse, Inc, 602 A2d 1173, 1174 (Me 1992) (citing FTC's Unfairness Policy
Statement); Swiger v Terminix International Co, 1995 WL 396467, *5 (Ohio Ct App);
Tucker v Sierra Builders, 180 SW 3d 109, 116-17 (Tenn Ct App 2005) (citing the
amended FTC Act). See also Belt, 80 Conn Bar J at 306 n 334 (cited in note 52), citing
United Companies Lending Corp v Sargeant, 20 F Supp 2d 192, 200-04 (D Mass 1998)
(applying the FTC's Unfairness Policy Statement in upholding a regulation promulgated
by the Massachusetts Attorney General without discussing Massachusetts authority on
the applicable standard).
56 See Conn Gen Stat § 42-110b(a) (2006); 5 Me Rev Stat Ann § 207 (1) (West 2006);
Mass Gen Laws Ann Ch 93a, § 2(a) (West 2006); Miss Code Ann § 75-24-5(1) (2006); NH
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II. CALIFORNIA'S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
In this Part, I describe the UCL and its treatment by the
state courts. First, I survey the law's history and substance.
Second, I examine the California courts' traditional definitions
of unfair business practices under the UCL. Third, I evaluate
the California Supreme Court's landmark decision in Cel-Tech
Communications, Inc v Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co, 5 7
which reshaped the definition of "unfair business practices" in
competitor actions.5 8 Finally, I outline how the California Courts
of Appeal have struggled defining unfairness in consumer claims
after the Cel- Tech decision.
A.

Overview of California's Unfair Competition Law

Frequently invoked by government agencies and private
plaintiffs, the UCL is California's most prominent consumer
protection statute.5 9 The California legislature modeled the
UCL, its "Little FTC Act," after the federal FTC Act. Shortly
after its enactment, the legislature amended it to prohibit
"unfair or fraudulent business practices."60 The California
Supreme Court has recognized the UCL's consumer protection
objectives, commenting that its primary purpose was to "extend

Rev Stat Ann § 358a:13 (2006); SC Code Ann § 39-5-20(a) (West 2006); 9 Vt Stat Ann
§ 2453(b) (2006); Wash Rev Code Ann § 19.86.920 (West 2006); W Va Code Ann § 46A-6104 (LexisNexis 2006), collected in Belt, 80 Conn B J at 249 n 6 (cited in note 52). See
also Michael M. Greenfield, Unfairness Under Section 5 of the FTC Act and Its Impact on
State Law, 46 Wayne L Rev 1869, 1929-34 (2000) (explaining that the state courts'
inconsistency might be the result of private consumers bringing most of the litigation
under state statutes, unlike FTC actions); D. Matthew Allen, David L. Luck, and Leah A.
Sevi, The Federal Characterof Florida'sDeceptive and Unfair Trade PracticesAct, 65 U
Miami L Rev 1083, 1101 (2011) (noting that several Florida state and federal court
decisions refer to the older unfairness standard since abandoned by the FTC).
5 973 P2d 527 (Cal 1999).
5 Competitor actions involve another business, not a consumer, challenging the
competitor's practice as unfair to its own business operations.
5
See Julia B. Strickland, Lisa M. Simonetti, and Andrew W. Moritz, An Overview
of California's Unfair Competition Law, *1 (STROOCK: Financial Services Litigation
Practice Group February 2004), online at http://www.stroock.comlSiteFiles/Publ68.pdf
(visited Sept 15, 2013).
6) See Joshua D. Taylor, Why the Increasing Role of Public Policy in California's
Unfair Competition Law Is a Slippery Step in the Wrong Direction, 52 Hastings L J 1131,
1133 (2011) (describing the evolution of UCL's predecessor and the UCL). The legislature
originally enacted the UCL to codify the common law prohibition of name infringement.
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[] to the entire consuming public the protection once afforded
only to business competitors."6 1
The UCL prohibits unfair competition as defined by five
acts: unlawful practices; unfair practices; fraudulent conduct;
deceptive advertising; and violations of California Business &
Professional Code § 17500.62 Because the act is drafted in the
disjunctive, it prohibits unfair business practices even if they
are not also unlawful or deceptive. 63 First, the unlawful prong
prohibits violations of other federal and state law under the
UCL. 64 Second, the "unfair" business practice prong generally
proscribes some acts, without actually describing what
constitutes such an act.6 5 In the absence of clear statutory
guidance, California courts first held that the UCL's prohibition
of unfair practices generally empowered the courts to broadly
target unpredicted "new schemes which the fertility of man's
invention would contrive."6 6 Third, the fraudulent prong
advances the UCL's consumer protections by requiring only
proof of deceit, unlike common law fraud.6 7 Finally, the
deceptive advertising prong of the UCL is comparable to the
UCL's fraud and § 17500 prongs. 68 These five types of unfair
competition ultimately prohibit a wide range of business
activity. For example, courts have found unfair business
practices where businesses charged consumers $20 for bounced
checks,6 9 violated zoning permit conditions, 70 or claimed false
contractual rights.71
Barquis v Merchants Collection Association, 496 P2d 817,
828 (Cal 1972)
(interpreting Cal Civ Code § 3369, the UCL's predecessor legislation).
62 See Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17200 (West 2008).
See also Sharon J. Arkin, The
Unfair Competition Law After Proposition 64: Changing the Consumer Protection
Landscape, 32 W St U L Rev 155, 157 (2005).
6
Cel-Tech, 973 P2d at 540.
64 See Arkin, 32 W St U L Rev at 158 (cited in note 62).
65 See generally Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17200
(West 2008). See also William L.
Stern, Bus & Prof Code § 17200 Practice, Ch 3-G § 3:113 (Rutter 2012) (explaining that
the statutory language was intentionally written to be "sweeping").
6 American Philatelic Society v Claibourne, 46 P2d 135, 140 (Cal 1935) (citations
omitted).
61 See Podolsky v First HealthcareCorp, 50 Cal App 4th 632,
647-48 (1996).
6
See Arkin, 32 W St U L Rev at 163 (cited in note 62). See also Stern, Ch 4-A § 4:1
(cited in note 65).
69 See generally Ballard v Equifax Check Services,
Inc, 158 F Supp 2d 1163 (ED Cal
2001).
70 See generally Hewlett v Squaw Valley Ski Corp, 54 Cal App 4th 499 (1997).
n See People v McKale, 602 P2d 731, 735-36 (Cal 1979).
61
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Representative of its remedial objectives, the UCL originally
granted standing to "any person" suing on behalf of "itself, its
members, or on behalf of the general public." 7 2 This prompted a
public outcry over perceived abuses of the UCL because the UCL
granted standing to plaintiffs without requiring them to show
any actual injury. In response, California voters approved
Proposition 64 to amend the UCL to require that the plaintiff
prove injury from the unfair practice. 73 Despite this stricter
standing requirement, both business competitors and consumers
may still sue under the UCL. 74
If a plaintiff prevails in his or her unfair competition action,
the UCL provides several remedies: injunctive relief,7 5
restitution,7 6 and civil penalties in government enforcement
actions.7 7 While the UCL does not directly award damages, 78 the
legislature gives the courts extensive equitable powers to
fashion remedies appropriate for the harms in each case. 79
Equitable remedies include restitutionary relief, like ordering
the defendant to disgorge the profits from his unfair
competition.8 0 Therefore, although a plaintiff may not directly
recover damages, the UCL's restitution remedy closely
resembles damages.8 1

72
See Mathieu Blackston, Comment, California's Unfair Competition LawMaking Sure the Avenger Is Not Guilty of the Greater Crime, 41 San Diego L Rev 1833,
1838 (2004), citing former Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17204 (West 2008).
7
See Hale v Sharp Healthcare, 183 Cal App 4th 1373, 1381 (2010). See also Cal
Bus & Prof Code § 17204 (West 2008) (allowing a person "who has suffered injury in fact
and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition" to bring suit under
the UCL); Blackston, Comment, 41 San Diego L Rev at 1833, 1848-56 (cited in note 72)
(discussing the public perception that plaintiffs abused the UCL's broad standing
requirements to harm businesses).
74 See Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17204 (West 2008).
75 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17203 (West 2008).
76 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17206.1(d) (West 2008).
7
Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17206 (West 2008).
7
See Bank of the West v Superior Court, 833 P2d 545, 552-53 (Cal 1992) (drawing
a contrast between a claim for common law unfair competition, which allows recovery of
damages, and § 17203, which does not).
' See Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17203 (West 2008).
a See Kraus v Trinity Management Services Inc, 999 P2d 718, 732-33 (Cal 2000).
s' See Arkin, 32 W St U L Rev at 164-65 (cited in note 62).
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Early Definitions of "Unfair Business Practices" Based on
the Cigarette Rule

Following the UCL's remedial and consumer protection
origins, the California Courts of Appeal initially used openended definitions of "unfair business practices." These
definitions generally included some or all of the FTC's Cigarette
Rule criteria. In one particularly influential opinion, People v

Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc,82 the court applied the
Cigarette Rule, 83 finding an unfair business practice when the
practice "offends an established public policy or when the
practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or
substantially injurious to consumers."84 Another early decision
described the unfairness test as the second prong of the
Cigarette Rule, the balancing of the utilities test, instructing
that "the court must weigh the utility of the defendant's conduct
against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim." 85
With some variation, California courts generally followed
the Casa Blanca test. Throughout the reign of the Casa Blanca
test, businesses protested the court's often arbitrary and
unpredictable application.8 6 Businesses and courts did not have
a clear understanding of what was an "unfair business practice"
under the UCL-a criticism similar to concerns about the
Cigarette Rule.87
159 Cal App 3d 509 (1984).
83 See id at 530. The Casa Blanca court described the
82

FIC's test as:

(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by
statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within
at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established
concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or
competitors or other businessmen.
Id at 530.
* Id.
' State Farm First & Casualty Co v Superior Court, 45 Cal App 4th 1093, 1104

(1996).
8 See Eugene S. Suh, Comment, Stealing from the Poor to Give to the Rich?
California's Unfair Competition Law Requires Further Reform to Properly Restore
Business Stability, 35 Sw U L Rev 229, 236-37 (2006) (detailing the abuses of the UCL's
"vague and overbroad statutory language"). See also Butler and Wright, 63 Fla L Rev at
177-78 (cited in note 46) (describing the backlash against laws in other states similar to
California's UCL because of their perceived abusive and frivolous law suits).
8
See Butler and Wright, 63 Fla L Rev at 177-78 (cited in note 46).
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C. The Cel-Tech Communications,Inc v Los Angeles Cellular
Telephone Co Standard For Competitor Actions

In Cel-Tech Communications, Inc v Los Angeles Cellular
Telephone Co, 88 the California Supreme Court tried to restore
clarity to the definition of "unfair business practices."8 9 Cel-Tech
involved cell phone competitors: the plaintiffs, who sold cell
phones, and the defendant, LA Cellular, a seller of both cell
phones and cell phone services.9 0 The plaintiffs claimed that LA
Cellular's practice of selling cell phones below cost to attract
customers to enter cell phone service contracts was "unfair"
under the UCL. 91 The California Supreme Court reviewed
existing definitions of unfair business practices and rejected
them as "too amorphous" because they "provide too little
guidance to courts and businesses." 92 The Cel-Tech court
reasoned that the vague public policy references under Casa
Blanca trespassed on the legislature's authority by allowing
excessive judicial discretion. 93 Furthermore, the court argued
that these ambiguous definitions failed to provide businesses
with sufficient guidelines regarding the conduct subject to
liability. 94
After outlining its criticisms of the current standards, the
Cel-Tech court created a stricter definition of unfairness. Noting
that § 5 of the FTC Act has language parallel to the UCL, the
court stressed that antitrust laws protect competition, not
competitors.9 5 To further guide courts and businesses, the court
held that an unfair business act is "conduct that threatens an
incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or
spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to
or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly
threatens or harms competition."9 6 This definition tied unfair
business acts in competitor actions to antitrust violations.
8 973 P2d 527 (Cal 1999).
89

See generally id.

9

Id at 533.

e1
92

Id.

9

See Cel-Tech, 973 P2d at 543.
See id.
Id.

95

Id at 543-44, relying on Cargill, Inc v Monfort of Colorado, Inc, 479 US 104, 115

9

(1986). See also 15 USC § 45.
96 See Cel-Tech, 973 P2d at 543.
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the prior definitions, the Celnew fairness standard to cases
twelve of its opinion, the court
say relates to actions by

consumers."97

Conflicting Outcomes in Consumer Cases after Cel-Tech

D.

The Cel-Tech court's attempt to clarify the bounds of unfair
competition claims ironically created more uncertainty. Before
the Cel-Tech decision, the courts generally applied some version
of the Cigarette Rule. But now, businesses and consumers face
uncertainty both in the legal rule and its application to the facts
of a case. California courts have had trouble reconciling the CelTech court's criticism of the old Casa Blanca standards with the
limiting language in footnote twelve.98 In particular, the
California Courts of Appeal have struggled with consumer
sometimes reaching misleading
unfair practice claims,
decisions.9 9 And unsurprisingly, many courts have tried to avoid
this confusion by revising the test.100 The Courts of Appeal
directly encountering the issue have used three different
definitions of unfair acts under the UCL: (1) the pre-Cel-Tech
definitions based on the FTC's Cigarette Rule; (2) the Cel-Tech
court's definition; and (3) the FTC § 5 definition.10 1

Id at 544 n 12.
I did not find any consistent patterns between certain districts of the California
Courts of Appeal and their definitions of unfairness. For example, the Courts of Appeal
in the Second District have adopted both the pre-Cel-Tech and § 5 tests. Compare Smith
v State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co, 93 Cal App 4th 700 (2001), with Camacho v
Auto Club of Southern California, 142 Cal App 4th 1394 (2006).
9 See, for example, Twin City Fire Insurance Co, Inc v Mitsubishi Motors Credit of
America, Inc, 2004 WL 5496230, *2 (CD Cal) (applying the old Casa Blanca test without
even mentioning the Cel-Tech decision).
1n See, for example, Phipps v Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2011 WL 302803, *16-17 (ED
Cal) (holding that no matter what the definitive test is for "unfair" under the UCL for
consumer claims, the consumer plaintiff failed to adequately allege an unfair business
practice under any of the tests); Bernardo v PlannedParenthoodFederationof America,
115 Cal App 4th 322, 353-54 (2004) (same).
Compare South Bay Chevrolet v General Motors Acceptance Corp, 72 Cal App 4th
10
861, 886 (1999), with Gregory v Albertson's, Inc, 104 Cal App 4th 845, 853-54 (2002) and
Camacho v Auto Club of Southern California,142 Cal App 4th 1394, 1403-04 (2006).
"

98
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The pre-Cel-Tech tests incorporating the Cigarette
Rule.

The California appellate courts' first approach holds that
the old standards still apply because the Cel-Tech court's stricter
definition does not apply to consumers. 102 As discussed, these
pre-Cel-Tech standards resemble the defunct Cigarette Rule.1 03

The

South Bay Chevrolet v

General Motors Acceptance

Corporation0 4 court was one of the first to reach this
conclusion. 105 Although the case involved business competitors,
the court described Cel-Tech in dicta as restricted to competitor
actions and concluded that in consumer actions the court must
"weigh the utility of the defendant's conduct against the gravity
of the harm to the alleged victim." 106
The Smith v State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co107 court
expanded on South Bay in a consumer's challenge of an insurer's
requirement that customers either purchase uninsured motorist
coverage for each of their vehicles or waive uninsured motorist
coverage for all of their vehicles.1 08 Although the Smith court
commented that "[c]ourts may not simply impose their own
notions of the day as to what is fair or unfair," the court adopted
the South Bay court's balancing test. 109 This balancing test
resembles one of the "amorphous" standards from the Cigarette
Rule. 110 In its ruling, the Smith court favorably quoted the Casa
Blanca court's statement of the Cigarette Rule. The Smith court

102
See, for example, Smith a State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 93 Cal
App 4th 700, 720 n 23 (2001).
103 See Part I.B. See, for example, Casa Blanca, 159
Cal App 3d at 530 (concluding
that "an 'unfair' business practice occurs when it offends an established public policy or
when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially
injurious to consumers").
104 72 Cal App 4th 861 (1999).
10 Id at 886 & n
24.
'06
Id at 886.
107 93 Cal App 4th 700
(2001).

'0

Id at 705-06.

1n

Id at 718-19.

no This balancing test is only one of the definitions of "unfair business practices"
that the prior courts used. See, for example, Casa Blanca, 159 Cal App 3d at 530
(outlining two different standards to define "unfair" from the federal Cigarette Rule:
"when [the practice] offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral,
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers").
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consequently adopted both a balancing test and the other two
criteria of the Cigarette Rule."'
Since the early decisions of South Bay and Smith, several
courts have adopted the balancing test and other forms of the
Cigarette Rule to define unfairness in consumer cases. 112 These
courts provide a variety of justifications for using the pre-CelTech standard in consumer actions. First, they stress that CelTech did not explicitly overrule the Cigarette Rule tests in
consumer actions.11 3 Moreover, they argue that the Cel-Tech
court's rejection of the prior standards for competitor actions
does not necessitate its rejection in consumer actions. For
example, when encountering this issue, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that without a clear ruling from the California
Supreme Court, courts do not err in using the Cigarette Rule's
balancing test. 114 Second, these courts argue for more malleable
tests in consumer cases because the UCL's ban of "unfair
business acts" specifically gives courts discretion to target
innovative schemes. 1 5 Finally, some decisions endorsing the
balancing test do so without mentioning the ambiguity left by
the Cel-Tech court.1 16 It is unclear whether these courts simply
did not recognize the Cel-Tech court's criticisms of the pre-Cel-

ux See Smith, 93 Cal App 4th at 718-21. The Smith court did not clearly explain its
treatment of the balancing test and two Cigarette Rule criteria. Given that it first
outlined the balancing test and then favorably restated the other Cigarette Rule criteria,
it seems the Smith court saw the balancing test as the primary analytical tool. In
addition, the balancing test likely involves the same inquiries in determining if a
practice "offends an established public policy" or is "immoral, unethical, oppressive,
unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers." When the practice either offends
public policy or represents immoral behavior, its harms probably exceed its benefits.
Accordingly, California Courts of Appeal endorsing the pre-Cel-Tech approach often
adopt both the balancing test and other Cigarette Rule criteria, without drawing any
meaningful distinction between these inquiries. See, for example, Ticconi v Blue Shield
of California Life & Health Insurance Co, 160 Cal App 4th 528, 539 (2008) (following
Smith).
112 See, for example, Horvath v LG Electronics Mobilecommunications
USA, Inc,
2012 WL 2861160, *10-11 (SD Cal).
113 See, for example, Quintero Family Trust v OneWest Bank, FSB, 2010 WL
2618729, *13 (SD Cal) (noting that the Cel-Tech court rejected the old unfairness test on
other grounds); Watkinson v MORTGAGEIT, Inc, 2010 WL 2196083, *6 (SD Cal) (same).
11 See Lozano v AT&T Wireless Services, Inc, 504 F3d 718, 735-37 (9th Cir 2007).
See also San FranciscoResidence Club, Inc v Amado, 773 F Supp 2d 822, 833 n 4 (ND
Cal 2011) (following Lozano and holding that because the parties did not specify either
test, the court would assume they rely on South Bay's balancing test).
See, for example, Smith, 93 Cal App 4th at 718.
'
1
See, for example, Ticconi, 160 Cal App 4th at 539; Kaszuba v Fidelity National
Default Services, 2011 WL 3563910, *2 (SD Cal) (referring only to the Cigarette Rule).
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Tech standards or if they implicitly distinguished Cel-Tech as
restricted to competitor cases.
2.

The Cel- Tech "tethering" test.

The California courts' second approach applies the Cel-Tech
court's definition of unfairness to consumer claims.1 17 Gregory v
Albertson's, Inc 18 is the dominant authority supporting the CelTech test. In Gregory, the court began its analysis of a
consumer's claim by recounting the Cel-Tech court's criticisms of
the Casa Blanca definitions and "[v]ague references to public
policy."119 The court preliminarily concluded that Cel-Tech is
limited to competitor challenges and, therefore, decisions by the
Courts of Appeal continue to provide the appropriate standard
for consumer actions. 120 But the Gregory court nevertheless
found that Cel-Tech cautions courts against using the
amorphous pre-Cel-Tech definitions in consumer claims. 121 The
Gregory court held that "where a claim of an unfair act or
practice is predicated on public policy, we read Cel-Tech to
require that the public policy predicating the action must be
'tethered' to specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory
provisions." 122 While the Gregory court's ruling is potentially
limited to claims based on public policy grounds, it is difficult to
imagine a consumer's unfairness action without an argument
that the practice offends public policy.
Many other decisions have endorsed the Cel-Tech test in
consumer claims of "unfair business acts or practices." 123 Like
the Gregory court, these courts emphasize the Cel-Tech court's
criticisms of the vague and amorphous standards like the
balancing test. 124 Some courts also reason that the Cel-Tech test
should apply to consumer actions because the UCL draws no

117 See, for example, Churchill Village, LLC v General Electric Co, 169
F Supp 2d
1119, 1130 (ND Cal 2000). I refer to this approach as the "Cel-Tech test."
us 104 Cal App 4th 845 (2002).
u9 See id at 852-53 (citation omitted).
120 See id at 853-54.
121 See id at
854.
122 Gregory, 104 Cal App
4th at 854.
123 See, for example, Scripps Clinic v The Superior Court
of San Diego, 108 Cal App
4th 917, 940 (2003).
124 See, for example, Durell v Sharp Healthcare, 183 Cal App 4th 1350,
1364-65
(2010).
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distinction between consumers and competitors. 125 And, similar
to the decisions endorsing the pre-Cel-Tech tests, some courts
apparently apply Cel-Tech without considering whether the CelTech court limited its impact to the competitor context. 126
3.

The FTC Act § 5 Test

The California appellate courts' third approach uses § 5 of
the FTC Act to define "unfair business acts and practices." The
1 27 court presents
Camacho v Auto Club of Southern California

the strongest arguments in favor of the § 5 test for unfairness.128
The Camacho court began its analysis of the consumer's claim
by reviewing the Cel-Tech court's criticism of the pre-Cel-Tech
standards. The court then determined that Cel-Tech overruled
these old tests in both competitor and consumer contexts.129
However, the Camacho court declined to apply the Cel-Tech test
to consumer cases for two reasons. First, the court argued that
requiring the underlying public policy to tether to a specific
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision "does not
comport with the broad scope of [the UCL]."130 In the Camacho
court's view, the Cel-Tech definition undermines the UCL's
prohibition of "unfair business acts or practices," distinct from
"unlawful" or "deceptive" practices. 13 1 Second, the court reasoned
that the anticompetitive conduct at issue in competitor actions is
closely related to antitrust law, unlike the varied laws
"tethering" to unfair business practices.132 Based on these two
arguments, the Camacho court concluded that the Cel-Tech test
is improper for consumer cases. 133
After rejecting the pre-Cel-Tech and Cel-Tech tests, 134 the
Camacho court turned to the Cel-Tech court's instruction to refer
125 See Churchill Village LLC, 169 F Supp 2d at 1130 n 10. This court, however,
acknowledged the Cel-Tech court's warning that its holding did not extend to consumer
actions. See generally Cal Bus & Prof § 17200 (West 2008).
126
See, for example, Rodriguez v US Bank, NA, 2012 WL 1996929, *6 (ND Cal).
127 142 Cal App 4th 1394
(2006).
128 Id at
1403.
129 Id at 1402.
130
131
132

Id.
Camacho, 142 Cal App 4th at 1402-03.
Id at 1403.

Id at 1402-03.
Id. In Camacho, the California Attorney General unsuccessfully urged the court
to apply the Cigarette Rule from FTC v Sperry & Hutchinson Co, 405 US 233, 244-45
'3

134
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to the FTC Act when defining unfair competition. 135 The court
thereby adopted the three-prong FTC § 5 test to find unfairness
where the consumer injury is (1) substantial; (2) not
"outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or
competition"; and (3) one that "consumers themselves could not
reasonably have avoided." 136
The Camacho court endorsed the § 5 test by arguing it is
both "more focused, less dependent on subjective notions of
fairness and ... easier to apply and administer" and explicitly
constructed for consumer claims. 137 And according to the
Camacho court, the test's second element, the balancing test,
ensures that courts still evaluate the practice by normative
standards.13 8
Even though the § 5 test is the newest of the three
alternatives to defining fairness, many Courts of Appeal have
endorsed it. For example, in Davis v Ford Motor Company,139
one Court of Appeals reconsidered its previous rulings in favor of
the pre-Cel-Tech tests, rejected the pre-Cel-Tech tests, and
applied the § 5 test instead. 140 However, it is still unclear
whether that particular court has changed its view or if the
change is just particular to those judges.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE THREE DEFINITIONS
In this Part, I argue that the California Supreme Court
should adopt the FTC § 5 definition of "unfair business acts or
practices" for consumer claims. First, I evaluate the merits of
the pre-Cel-Tech and Cel-Tech standards for unfair business
practices to explain why these standards are flawed. Second, I

(1972) to accommodate the expansive scope of the UCL. Camacho, 142 Cal App 4th at
1403-04.
135
Camacho, 142 Cal App 4th at 1403.
136

Id at 1403-5.

137

Id at 1403-04.
Id at 1404.

138

139 179 Cal App 4th 581 (2009).
140 Id at 594-97. See also Eric P. Enson, Davis v. Ford Motor Credit
Company: More
Confusion Regarding the Definition of "Unfair"or an Indication of Growing Consensus?,
19 Competition J Anti & Unfair Comp L Section St Bar Cal 24, 26-29 (2010)
(summarizing the Davis court's decision and remarking that the appellate court's
reconsideration of the pre-Cel-Tech balancing test for the § 5 test suggests a growing
consensus in favor of the § 5 test).
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examine the FTC § 5 test to argue that it is a better alternative
to the pre-Cel-Tech and Cel-Tech standards.
A.

Pre-Cel-Tech Tests

The pre-Cel-Tech tests use various forms of the three
Cigarette Rule criteria to define "unfair business acts or
practices." The Smith court mainly endorsed a simple balancing
test but also favorably restated the two other Cigarette Rule
factors:
The test of whether a business practice is unfair involves
an examination of [that practice's] impact on its alleged
victim, balanced against the reasons, justifications and
motives of the alleged wrongdoer . . . [T]he court must

weigh the utility of the defendant's conduct against the
gravity of the harm to the alleged victim . .. [A]n "unfair"

business practice occurs when that practice offends an
established public policy or when the practice is immoral,
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially
injurious to consumers.14 1
1.

Arguments in favor of the pre-Cel-Tech tests.

The pre-Cel-Tech definitions have three related benefits: (1)
flexibility; (2) support of the UCL's consumer protection goals;
and (3) a large body of state case law applying the Cigarette
Rule. First, the pre-Cel-Tech test provides substantial flexibility
in targeting evolving commercial exploitation. California courts
originally followed the Cigarette Rule standards to deter the
abusive business schemes that the legislature could not predict
ahead of time.142 In contrast to the FTC's administrative
enforcement powers, this considerable judicial discretion also
has the benefit of early detection through private-consumer
actions. These claims lead to quick determinations of whether a
competitive act is unfair.143 While the FTC can provide clearer
guidance and notice, its bureaucratic investigations are slower,
Smith, 93 Cal App 4th at 718-19 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
See, for example, Barquis v Merchants Collection Association, 496 P2d 817,
829-31 (Cal 1972) (arguing that the UCL establishes a wide standard to guide courts of
equity and that "the Legislature evidently concluded that a less inclusive standard
would not be adequate").
143 See Blackston, Comment, 41 San Diego L Rev at 1865 (cited in
note 73).
141
142
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and its cease-and-desist orders are less beneficial to consumers
than the UCL's injunctive and restitutionary remedies. 14 4
Flexibility also conceivably enhances the UCL's remedies. The
courts can tailor this standard by considering whether the public
policy predicate to the challenged practice is tethered to
legislation or regulations when awarding equitable relief in UCL
consumer claims. 145 The pre-Cel-Tech standards conceivably ban
a wide range of behavior. So, when dealing with prohibited but
relatively minor abuses, the courts can adjust the standard by
awarding less equitable remedies.
Second, the pre-Cel-Tech test's greater flexibility also
supports-at least on first glance-the UCL's consumer
protection objectives. The California legislature intended the
UCL to provide extensive protections for consumers and
businesses against unfair competition.146 Legislatures want to
strengthen regulations and consumer rights by enacting
consumer protection statutes like California's UCL.147 Not only
is the UCL intended to provide antitrust protections parallel to
the FTC Act, but it also serves as California's primary consumer
protection law. 14 8 Maintaining a separate standard for the
consumers is important because antitrust law more narrowly
tethers to anti-competitive practices than the greater universe of
laws supporting a consumer's claim of "unfair business
practices."149 And while the UCL has led to abusive litigation,
the legislature has repeatedly denied efforts to reform the
statute and has even expanded the UCL's reach in response to
limiting judicial action.15 0 This legislative action suggests that it
144
Id at 1865 n 156 (commenting that while the FTC can give notice to the
marketplace, it also allows businesses a "free bite" before the FTC officially investigates
and prohibits an unfair practice).
145 Id at 1866.
146
See Barquis, 496 P2d at 829-31 (explaining that the UCL's predecessor was not
intended to be confined to anti-competitive business practices but also extends more
broadly for consumer protection purposes).
147 See Michael S. Greve, Consumer Law, Class Actions, and the Common Law, 7
Chap L Rev 155, 173-76 (2004) (drawing a contrast between increasing consumer
protections and redundantly codifying rights under other laws).
148 See Strickland, Simonetti, and Moritz, An Overview of California's Unfair
Competition Law at *1 (cited in note 59).
149 See Blackston, Comment, 41 San Diego L Rev at 1866 (cited in note 73).
15
See Greve, 7 Chap L Rev at 176 n 140 (cited in note 147), citing, for example, Cal
Bus & Prof Code § 17203 (West 2008), superseding Mangini v Aerojet-General Corp, 230
Cal App 3d 1125, 1156 (1991). But see Butler and Johnston, 2010 Colum Bus L Rev at 6
(cited in note 35) (discussing a popular referendum that amended the UCL to require
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wishes to keep the UCL as broad as possible to advance the
law's consumer protection goals.
Considering the UCL's consumer protection objectives, the
pre-Cel-Tech tests arguably provide the greatest consumer
protections. Since businesses face uncertain judicial findings of
unfairness under these relatively vague standards, they have
strong incentives to monitor their behavior and refrain from
exploitative practices. Consumers might benefit from keeping
these potential offenders in the dark. If the unfair business
practice standard is more of a bright line rule, then the
unscrupulous business will simply maneuver around the line to
extract benefits from the consumer without penalty.
Third, given its roots in the Cigarette Rule, this test allows
the California courts to draw on voluminous case law in
evaluating unfair practice claims. 15 1 It therefore theoretically
advances legal uniformity between the states in defining unfair
competition under the "Little FTC Acts" because half of the
states with similar unfair competition laws follow some form of
the Cigarette Rule in defining unfair practices. 152 This
uniformity benefits businesses dealing in different states
because it allows them to more easily comply with various
regulatory regimes.
2.

Arguments against the pre-Cel-Tech tests.

The pre-Cel-Tech definitions of "unfair business practices"
have four important weaknesses: (1) increased legal uncertainty
despite its more uniform use across the states; (2) overdeterrence; (3) more opportunities for abusive litigation; and (4)
additional administrative costs. First, these standards burden
businesses with an uncertain liability regime. Businesses may
not know what practices the courts will consider unfair before a
consumer challenges them and wins a costly award. The
amorphous quality of the pre-Cel-Tech tests provides
significantly less guidance on acceptable commercial practices
than the § 5 test. As discussed below, delegating such great
discretion to courts inexperienced in complex consumer
transactions could lead to haphazard decision making. The preplaintiffs to also show actual injury and reliance).
'51 See Belt, 80 Conn Bar J at 319 (cited in note 52).
152 Id at 319 n 414. But, as I argue, this uniformity is better
characterized as a
uniform use of an unpredictable rule.
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Cel-Tech standards are too undefined to constitute a valid legal
principal because they do not provide any easily recognizable
behavioral norm. 153 These definitions offer relatively thin labels
that encourage the courts to use conclusory reasoning.1s4 As one
commentator describes: "Opinions on direct unfairness claims
usually follow the same script: they quote one or more of the
above tests for unfairness. They then restate the facts. Finally,
they state the conclusion that the facts satisfy or do not satisfy
the test for liability."15 5 This amorphous analysis makes
businesses' compliance efforts more difficult. Consumer
advocates may argue this uncertainty provides the best
protection to consumers since businesses have an incentive to
constantly check their behavior. But the situation is not so
simple. Rather, the balancing test's ambiguous nature may not
provide optimal deterrence. It may instead over-deter
businesses' information sharing practices. In their compliance
efforts, businesses may refrain from behavior that both is fair
and offers efficiency benefits that trickle down to the consumer
in the form of greater business price, product, and service
competition.1 56
Second, the pre-Cel-Tech tests may therefore chill
information sharing and incentivize sellers to make only
detailed and cautionary descriptions of their products and the
associated risks because of the heightened risk of liability.15 7 For
example, if faced with this standard, a business offering credit
card services may hesitate from informing consumers about the
potential benefits from a line of credit out of a fear that a state
court may find the practice unfair even if it complied with

153 See, for example, Rice, 52 Geo Wash L Rev at 21-22
(cited in note 20) (arguing
the FTC's substantial consumer injury criterion "only partially fulfills the role of a legal
standard because it fails to state a behavioral norm").
14
See, for example, Horvath, 2012 WL 2861160 at *10-11 (summarizing plaintiff's
arguments and then immediately concluding that the alleged harm to the plaintiff
outweighs any benefits to the business); Sawchak and Nelson, 90 NC L Rev at 2052-54
(cited in note 15) (collecting conclusory decisions by North Carolina state and federal
courts).
15s Sawchak and Nelson, 90 NC L Rev at 2052 (cited in note 15) (discussing the
similarly constructed North Carolina unfair competition law).
156 See generally Rice, 52 Geo Wash L Rev at 57-58 (cited in note 20).
157 See id. Although Rice directs her criticisms to the § 5 test, her comments apply
with even greater weight to the significantly more amorphous Cigarette Rule criteria
used in the pre-Cel-Tech definitions of unfair practices. See id.
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disclosure rules.15 8 Courts could perhaps limit this disclosure
problem by properly accounting for the benefits of the
challenged practice. If the practice has efficiency benefits that
boost competition and benefit consumers, then the court could
find that, on balance, the practice is not unfair. In addition,
given the apparent complexity of this disclosure problem, it is
unlikely to be a frequent issue for businesses and the courts.
Generally, businesses, consumers, and courts would see more
consumer disclosures as a socially beneficial practice, not an
unfair one.
Third, the pre-Cel-Tech test incentivizes frivolous litigation.
Before the Cel-Tech decision, commentators noted that attorneys
used the amorphous definitions of unfairness to burden
California businesses
with litigation expenses.15 9
The
combination of private actions, generous remedies, broad
definitions of prohibited conduct, judges' inexperience in
complicated consumer transactions, and relaxed common law
standards is likely too attractive a mix for plaintiffs'
attorneys.160 As one critic states, the UCL lawsuits "were
initiated by lawyers, not injured consumers, and they all seek
court-ordered attorney fees and the only beneficiaries of these
cases, most of which settle for a nuisance value, are the lawyers
who bring them."' 6 ' Given their unpredictability, the pre-CelTech standards present the greatest possibility for a "litigation
tax" on all consumer goods and services.162
If the California Supreme Court adopted the pre-Cel-Tech
test for consumer claims, it could cause a return to the abuses
prevalent under the prior standards. Abusive lawsuits harm
California's economy because they make the state less attractive

1ss To carry this example further, a consumer creditor may wish to provide a greater
description of the credit card terms than the mechanical requirements under the Truth
in Lending Act. This could conceivably include the creditor's projection of the variable
interest rates based on current business conditions. However, the creditor may refrain
from telling the consumer about its projections because of the risk its disclosures may
constitute an "unfair business practice" under the UCL. Since such projections are only
estimates, a court could see them as manipulative and, therefore, unfair.
19
See Sub, Comment, 35 Sw UL Rev at 236-37 (cited in note 86).
160 See Butler and Wright, 63 Fla L Rev at 166 (cited in note 46).
161 See Suh, Comment, 35 Sw U L Rev at 237 (cited in note 86), quoting Del Stewart,
The Latest Kind of Amazing Lawsuits, San Diego Union Trib B-11 (Sep 18, 1997).
162 See Butler and Johnston, 2010 Colum Bus L Rev at 44
(cited in note 35) (arguing
that "expansive and uncertain" liability imposes a tax on every consumer good and
service).
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to businesses and cost California taxpayers millions of dollars in
revenue each year. 163 Courts and businesses could try to limit
these abuses by eliminating frivolous claims during pre-trial
motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment.164
However, pre-trial litigation nevertheless poses significant costs
to businesses.
Fourth, the pre-Cel-Tech tests also impose greater
administrative costs for the courts given their susceptibility to
frivolous litigation. UCL lawsuits clog the California courts,
which administer 1.5 million suits in a single year.165 Moreover,
the pre-Cel-Tech standards burden courts with the difficult task
of properly instructing juries on the tests' application. 166
Altogether, the flexibility of the pre-Cel-Tech tests is both
its greatest strength and weakness in consumer suits. Given the
difficulty of predetermining all predatory and "unfair" business
practices, it is useful to empower the courts with discretion to
subjectively consider a practice to determine whether it
victimizes consumers. However, this flexible test is also an
amorphous one, ripe for abuse by plaintiffs' attorneys. The CelTech court was right to reject a standard that provides too little
guidance to the courts, and consequently, increases legal
uncertainty, deters healthy disclosure, enables frivolous
litigation, and imposes high administrative costs.
B.

The Cel-Tech Test

The Gregory court adapted the Cel-Tech test for consumer
cases, stating "where a claim of an unfair act or practice is
predicated on public policy . . . the public policy which is a
163 See Suh, Comment, 35 Sw U L Rev at 238 (cited in note 86) (citation
omitted).
See also Evan Halper and Marc Lifsher, Initiative Seeks Curbs on Consumer Lawsuits,
LA Times (LA Times July 6, 2004), online at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/
jul/06/locallme-consumer6 (visited on Sept 15, 2013) (describing the arguments for and
against Proposition 64 to amend the UCL).
164 See, for example, Motors, Inc v Times Mirror Co, 102 Cal App 3d 735, 740 (1980)
(explaining that the question of unfairness could potentially be resolved by a motion for
summary judgment).
165
See Sub, Comment, 35 Sw U L Rev at 244 (cited in note 86) (describing the total
number of claims brought in California courts between 2003 and 2004). However, the
percentage of UCL unfairness suits is unclear. Given that plaintiffs often allege "unfair
business practices" as part of a multi-claim lawsuit, the number may be significant.
166 See David L. Belt, Should the FTC's Current Criteria for Determining "Unfair
Acts or Practices"Be Applied to State 'Little FTC Acts"?, 9-FEB Antitrust Source 1, 9-10
(2010). Yet, it is unclear how this is not a problem with all three tests. For instance,
courts may have trouble adequately describing a "sufficiently tethered predicate policy."
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predicate to the action must be 'tethered' to
constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions." 167

specific

1.

Arguments in favor of the Cel-Tech test.

The Cel-Tech test's strengths include: (1) increased legal
certainty; (2) few additional burdens on consumers; and (3)
uniformity across unfairness claims in California. First, the CelTech test furthers the Cel-Tech court's goals of promoting
predictable liability. As a general principal, courts should read
legal opinions and documents as a whole.168 The majority of the
Cel-Tech court's opinion criticized the pre-Cel-Tech tests as too
ambiguous in light of a business's legitimate need to know what
the UCL allows and forbids.169 If the Cel-Tech court meant to
leave the pre-Cel-Tech tests intact for consumers, it could have
distinguished the consumer case law and competitor case law.170
But the Cel-Tech court did not explicitly draw that distinction.
Even though the Cel-Tech court limited its ruling to competitors,
the thrust of its opinion does not suggest that the California
Supreme Court would view the definitions any differently in
consumer cases.171
Applying the Cel-Tech test to consumer cases therefore
advances the California Supreme Court's goal of predictable
liability. This is a reasonable goal because businesses need to
know what practices are legally acceptable in order to properly
structure their transactions with consumers. The Cel-Tech test
produces more predictable results because businesses can look to
already-enacted law to determine what practices the UCL
condemns. Businesses can then structure their dealings to
properly comply with the UCL and other law. Legislation and
regulation already "on the books" is a more certain body of
authority by which to structure business practices than the
whims of a jury.

Gregory, 104 Cal App 4th at 854.
16
See Merchants' National Bank of San Francisco v Carmichael, 196 P 76, 78 (Cal
Ct App 1920).
169
See Cel-Tech, 973 P2d at 542-43.
17o See Respondent's Consolidated Answer to Briefs
of Amici Curiae Consumer
Attorneys of California and the Attorney General, Bardin v Daimlerchrysler Corp, Civil
Action No G034590, *4-5, (Cal App Dist filed Dec 7, 2005) ("Bardin Brief').
17
See Cel-Tech, 973 P2d at 538-44.
167
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Second, the Cel-Tech definition is not overly harsh simply
because it requires the plaintiff to show that the underlying
public policy tethers to some enacted law. Rather, the tethering
requirement only eliminates frivolous litigation in unfairness
claims that lack any legislative or regulatory support. The
consumer is not left without remedy under the Cel-Tech test
because of the scope of state and federal law.172 Tethering the
public policy predicate to a specific provision arguably does not
require the plaintiff to separately prove the practice is actually
unlawful under another state or federal law but only that it
meaningfully relates to some legal authority. 173
uniform
Third, the Cel-Tech standard establishes
definitions of "unfair business acts and practices" for consumer
and competitor actions under California's UCL.174 California
courts have reasoned that the UCL's primary purpose was to
"extend[ ] to the entire consuming public the protection once
afforded only to business competitors." 175 This suggests that the
California legislature intended to put consumers and
competitors on equal, but not better, footing. Furthermore, the
California legislature enacted only one definition of unfairness;
it created no statutory distinction between consumer and
competitor unfairness claims. 76 The word "unfair," therefore,
should only have one meaning. Since the legislature drew no
such distinction, the UCL's meaning should not vary based on
which parties bring the action.
In addition, applying a different standard in consumer and
competitor cases could create additional litigation over whether
a plaintiff is a competitor or consumer.' 77 This new litigation
could merely shift administrative costs from applying an
amorphous definition of unfairness to determining if the
See Bardin Brief at *4-5 (cited in note 170).
17
Id.
174 This uniformity contrasts with the type of uniformity advanced
by the pre-CelTech tests, which expand uniformity among the different states, not within California
law.
171 See Barquis, 496 P2d at 829 (interpreting the UCL's predecessor).
See also Bank
of the West, 833 P2d at 552-53 (summarizing that before the UCL the common law tort
of unfair competition did not provide an effective consumer remedy).
'
See generally Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17200 (West 2008).
177 See, for example, National Rural Telecommunications Co-op v DIRECTV, Inc,
319 F Supp 2d 1059, 1075-77 (CD Cal 2003) (considering whether Cel-Tech standard
applied to a plaintiff's based on the defendant's claim that it competed with the
plaintiff).
172
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plaintiff is a consumer or competitor. 7 8 And if the consumers
could still sue businesses under the amorphous pre-Cel-Tech
tests, businesses would still face the unpredictable liability
regime criticized by the Cel-Tech court. Facing only a vague
unfairness test for consumer challenges does not meaningfully
increase certainty over the UCL's reach.
2.

Arguments against the Cel-Tech test.

The Cel-Tech test has three significant weaknesses: it (1)
weakens the UCL's consumer protections; (2) contradicts the
UCL's structure; and (3) is inconsistent with the Cel-Tech court's
reasoning. First, the Cel-Tech test does not adequately protect
consumers. California courts have repeatedly explained that
consumers, not competitors, need the greatest protection from
"sharp business practices." 179 The courts have also rejected the
argument that the UCL (and its predecessor) is limited to
"anticompetitive business practices" and does not extend more
generally to advance consumer protection goals.18 0 Applying the
same Cel-Tech standard to both consumers and competitors
would arguably return California law to its pre-UCL state,
which lacked meaningful consumer protections. In contrast, the
California legislature intended that the UCL and its predecessor
expand the common law's prohibition of unfair competition,
which protected competitors alone, because consumers need the
greatest legal protection.1 8 1 Further, a concurrence in Cel-Tech
argued that the UCL's purpose is to prevent deceptive conduct,
not merely to act as an extension of antitrust law's prohibitions
of restraints of trade. 182
Second, the Cel-Tech tethering test weakens the "unfair
business acts and practices" prong of the UCL, contrary to the
UCL's disjunctive structure. Since the test's tethering
requirement demands that the public policy predicate relate to

11
I did not find many of these cases in my research. The added litigation over
whether a challenger is a consumer or competitor might be insignificant.
no See Barquis, 496 P2d at 829-31.
1so See id at 829.
181 See Michael Wallenstein, Comment, Gun Manufacturers and Unfair Business
Practices,30 Sw U L Rev 435, 463-64 (2001) ('This new definition would seem to anchor
the law of unfair business practices to its old moorings of common law protection of
business competition and significantly narrow the scope of the [UCL].").
182
See Cel-Tech, 973 P2d at 547 (Kennard concurring).
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established law, it collapses the separate prohibition of "unfair
business acts or practices" into unlawful or fraudulent
practices. 183 This test renders the UCL's independent
prohibition of "unfair business acts and practices" redundant if
"unfair" actually means "unlawful."184 This reading of the UCL
violates
the
statutory
interpretation
canon
against
surplusage.185 Under this general rule, California courts
interpret statutes to avoid rendering sections redundant by
giving them an independent meaning. 186
Moreover, conflating "unfair" with "unlawful" does not
advance the legislature's goal of providing a separate proscribed
category inclusive of behavior the legislature had not yet
encountered and prohibited.18 7 Applying the Cel-Tech test to
consumer claims could subsequently limit consumer protections
against unscrupulous practices not explicitly proscribed by law.
As predatory businesses innovate, consumers encountering a
new practice might have no remedy because the legislature or
regulators have not yet "tethered" the new scam to a legal
policy. 88 Proponents of the Cel-Tech test may respond that the
test does not require the plaintiff to prove that the practice
actually violates an established law.1 89 But the test still
requires, at minimum, the legislature to have previously
encountered the practice in some capacity and create some legal
authority against the practice. In today's rapidly evolving and
§ 17200 (West 2008) (prohibiting unlawful, deceptive,
and unfair business practices in the disjunctive). See also Sharon J. Arkin, The Effective
Use of California's Unfair Competition Law to Redress Managed Care Abuses, 22
Whittier L Rev 467, 474-75 (2000); Bardin v Daimlerchrysler Corp, 136 Cal App 4th
1268, 1267 (2006) (noting the California Attorney General's argument that extending the
Cel-Tech test to consumer actions would effectively "write[] the unfair prong out of the
statute").
18
In order to show the challenged practice "tethers" to some legally grounded
policy, the consumer would likely have to show it offends the letter of the law or at least
its spirit. But it is unclear what exactly "tether" means.
185
See Chickasaw Nation v United States, 534 US 84, 94-95 (2001) (recognizing the
canon of statutory interpretation against surplusage but declining to apply it where
"inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest of the statute"). In contrast, it is
difficult to argue that the UCL's "unfairness" was either "inadvertently inserted" or
"repugnant to the rest of the statute."
188 See In re JW, 57 P2d 363, 369-70 (Cal 2002).
187 See Mosk v National Research Company of California, 201 Cal App 2d 765, 772
(1962).
188 See Blackston, Comment, 41 San Diego L Rev at 1864-65 (cited
in note 72).
189 See Gregory, 104 Cal App 4th at 854 (adopting the tethering
test without
explicitly requiring the plaintiff to establish the actual illegality of the practice).
183

See Cal Bus & Prof Code
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sophisticated marketplace, this may be asking too much of the
legislature and regulators.
Third, extending the Cel-Tech test to consumer suits
misreads the Cel-Tech decision. The court's limiting language in
footnote twelve suggests the court did not equate the unfairness
question for competitor cases to consumer cases. If the court had
desired the same standard, it could have rejected the Casa
Blanca tests for all suits alleging "unfair business practices."
However, this is a weak argument because the court could have
simply wished to save that question for another day. Just as we
cannot infer anything from the court's choice not to distinguish
consumer cases from competitor cases, we cannot definitively
infer anything from the court's decision to limit its holding to the
facts of the case.
Although the Cel-Tech test moves the UCL too far in the
other direction, the Cel-Tech standard has its advantages: it
encourages predictable administration of claims to the benefit of
the courts, businesses, and consumers. However, the test also
undermines the UCL's goal of providing flexible protections
against evolving exploitations in the marketplace. Therefore, the
California Supreme Court should reject the Cel-Tech test as
inconsistent with the UCL.
C.

The FTC Act § 5 Test

The FTC § 5 test requires that the consumer's injury (1) is
substantial; (2) "not outweighed by any offsetting consumer or
competitive benefits that the sales practice also produces"; and
(3) not one the consumer could have "reasonably avoided."19 0
1.

Arguments in favor of the FTC § 5 test.

The California Supreme Court should adopt the FTC § 5
test for "unfair business practices" in consumer actions. The
FTC test is the best of the three approaches because it (1)
provides sufficient flexibility for consumer protection purposes;
(2) limits abusive litigation; (3) and advances uniformity
between California and federal law. First, the § 5 test is both
sufficiently flexible and specific to give the courts direction of

190

15 USC § 45.
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what practices are unfair under the UCL.19 1 The second prong of
the § 5 test directs the court to use the same normative
considerations of unfairness as the pre-Cel-Tech balancing
test. 192 Balancing the practice's costs and benefits gives
California courts discretion to weigh a practice's overall social
utility, without considering whether the underlying public policy
tethers to established law.
This normative evaluation, with its accompanying
flexibility, is truer to the California legislature's intent to
advance consumer protection goals. 193 This balancing is
important because it can adapt to emerging commercial
practices, unlike the Cel-Tech test. It is also an uncontroversial
element. In a competitive environment, it is difficult to imagine
why a business would act in a way that damages consumers
more than benefits consumers. The only conceivable explanation
for such action is an intent to defraud or victimize the consumer
through commercial coercion.
Second, the § 5 approach broadens the court's scrutiny of a
transaction, compared to the Cigarette-Rule-derived pre-CelTech definitions, to limit abusive litigation. Namely, the "not
reasonably avoidable" consumer injury prong addresses the
consumer's options at the time of injury.194 Evaluations of
consumer behavior and commercial coercion facilitate the courts'
efforts to eliminate frivolous litigation since the test rejects an
opportunistic lawsuit where a consumer had alternatives to the
injury. 195 The test provides greater legal certainty because the
courts will find unfairness only if the business unreasonably
blocks the free exercise of consumer decision making.196

See Camacho, 142 Cal App 4th at 1404.
Compare Camacho, 142 Cal App 4th at 1404 (detailing the second element
of the
§ 5 test as "the injury must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to
consumers or competition"), with Smith, 93 Cal App 4th at 718 (specifying the balancing
test as "an examination of that practice's impact on its alleged victim, balanced against
the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer").
193
See Part II.A.
'9
See Sawchak and Nelson, 90 NC L Rev at 2060-61 (cited in note 15) (arguing
that the North Carolina courts should apply the federal definition of unfairness in North
Carolina's similarly constructed unfair competition law).
19 Id at 2072-73. On the other hand, the likelihood of a consumer consciously
suffering injury as part of a manufactured lawsuit seems low. The UCL only awards
damages for restitution and would not give this unscrupulous consumer a windfall. See
Cal Prof & Bus Code § 17203 (West 2008).
196
See Sawchak and Nelson, 90 NC L Rev at 2060-61 (cited in note
15).
191
192
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Businesses can hardly complain that they must tailor their
practices to avoid coercing a consumer's choices. Rather, this
requirement benefits businesses by protecting them against a
competitor who gains an advantage through eliminating free
commercial choice. Considerations of substantial consumer
harm likewise help the courts focus on serious misconduct by
businesses.
Third, the reasonable avoidance and substantial injury
elements supplement the otherwise amorphous pre-Cel-Tech
balancing test and other Cigarette Rule formations of
"unfairness." By these requirements, the § 5 test reins in the
abusive claims straying from the UCL's purpose of
complementing the FTC Act. 197 Past scholarship shows that
state "Little FTC Acts" impose greater liability on businesses
than the FTC's Cigarette Rule or the § 5 test and, accordingly,
over-deter commercial behavior useful for businesses and
consumers.1 98 Conversely, the Cel-Tech and pre-Cel-Tech
definitions do not further the UCL's goal of complementing the
FTC's consumer protections. These alternatives counteract the
FTC's balance between optimal consumer protections and public
welfare. 199 This imbalance often presents itself because the
interests of private litigants may not always align with the
overall public interest. Adopting the § 5 test would consequently
help bring California's UCL back in line with its federal roots. 200
At the same time, these requirements do not bar any
legitimate claims under the UCL. 20 1 If consumers cannot show a
non-negligible harm from the challenged practice, the claim is
probably frivolous. In contrast, the Cel-Tech test does not
consider the overall consumer harm, which implies that liability
attaches to potentially insignificant harms. Additionally,
requiring that the consumer could not reasonably avoid the
197 See Butler and Wright, 63 Fla L Rev at 165 (cited in note 46) (explaining that
state "Little FTC Acts" were originally meant to supplement the Federal Trade
Commission's consumer protection goals).
198 See id at 187-88 (finding that under a "Shadow FTC's" analysis, 78 percent of
sample state claims would not constitute unfair or deceptive conduct under the FTC
policy statements).

199 Id.
200

Recall that California's UCL was directly modeled on the federal FTC. See Part

H.A.
201 See Camacho, 142 Cal App 4th at 1405 (arguing that
the California Attorney
General and the consumer plaintiff could not identify any type of legitimate cases that
the § 5 test would systematically exclude from the UCL's reach).
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practice's harm ensures businesses protect a consumer's free
choice, rather than imposing an additional due care requirement
on the consumer. Under the reasonable avoidance requirement,
the proper focus is on whether the business coercively restricted
the consumer's choices, not if the consumer failed to exercise due
care in interacting with the business. 202
Businesses similarly benefit from this guided test of
consumer fairness, in comparison to a pre-Cel-Tech regime,
because they can better police their practices. In contrast to the
pre-Cel-Tech regime, businesses would likely have trouble
predicting ex ante what a court may find unfair ex post under
only a consideration of the practice's costs and benefits.
Businesses know that they cannot restrict consumers' free
decision-making without risking liability. Likewise, the § 5 test
is not onerous simply because it penalizes business practices
that cause consumers substantial harm.
Fourth, the § 5 test promotes uniformity between California
and federal law. 2 0 3 The California Supreme Court has endorsed
references to the FTC's definitions of unfair business practice
claims. 204 Some commentators even believe there is potential
trend in the California courts toward endorsing the § 5 test over
the competing approaches. 205 For example, the Davis court
abandoned its previous endorsements of the pre-Cel-Tech tests
for the FTC § 5 test. 206 And since the Cigarette Rule's rejection
in 1980, there will be no further federal court or agency
decisions to provide guidance on unfair business practice claims
as defined by the pre-Cel-Tech tests. 207 The FTC's adoption of
the § 5 test, over the pre-Cel-Tech standards, suggests that the
California courts should also reject those outdated definitions of
unfair practices. 208 The FTC is an agency with considerable
See notes 230-233 and accompanying text.
See generally 15 USC § 45.
204
See, for example, Mosk, 201 Cal App 2d at 772-73 ("In view of the similarity of
language and obvious identity of purpose of the two statutes, decisions of the federal
court on the subject are more than ordinarily persuasive.").
205
See, for example, Enson, 19 Competition J Anti & Unfair Comp L See St Bar Cal
at 28-29 (cited in note 140).
206
See 179 Cal App 4th at 595-97; Enson, 19 Competition J Anti & Unfair Comp L
See St Bar Cal at 28-29 (cited in note 140).
207
See Belt, 80 Conn Bar J at 317-18 (cited in note 52) (outlining some of the
arguments in favor of applying the federal § 5 test to state law unfairness actions).
208
See Barquis, 496 P2d at 829-31 (summarizing the UCL's legislative origins and
its similarities to the Federal Trade Commission Act and federal jurisprudence).
202
203

524

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2013

expertise in consumer protection and developed the § 5 test
specifically for consumer actions. 209
Promoting uniformity between California and federal law
would produce several benefits. First, it would provide an
increased volume of persuasive case law and FTC investigations
to help California courts in applying the § 5 test.2 10 California
courts can use federal and state court decisions for guidance in
applying the same three-prong test in unfair competition actions
under the FTC Act. In addition, as the FTC continues to grow
more experienced in applying the revised § 5 test, its expertise
will also help California courts evaluate California's own
unfairness claims. It is reasonable for the state courts to defer to
the FTC's definitions of unfair practices given both the FTC's
active role in the states' adoption of the "Little FTC Acts" and its
commercial expertise. 211 Therefore, this form of uniformity is
superior to the state-centric uniformity advanced by the CelTech and pre-Cel-Tech standards.
Second, uniformity with federal law gives businesses a
better opportunity to comply with the UCL. Since this federal
standard applies to businesses across the nation, businesses
operating in many different states do not need to waste
resources trying to comply with another standard of fairness. As
it is federal law, California businesses already must comply with
the § 5 test of unfair business practices. 212 Extending the CelTech's tethering standard could be difficult for courts as the
body of available law addressing consumer harms could be much
greater than the small universe of antitrust law. Furthermore,
businesses benefit because their unscrupulous competitors face

209

See Part I.A.

210 See Sawchak and Nelson, 90 NC L Rev at 2080-81 (cited in note 15) (making a

similar argument to apply the FTC definition in unfairness claims under North Carolina
law). While the Supreme Court rejected the concept of a federal common law in Erie
Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64, 78 (1938), the California courts may consider
federal law as persuasive, not mandatory, authority. To some extent, promoting
uniformity of federal and state definitions of unfairness may push against Erie's
boundaries. But under this proposal, the California courts are not bound by federal
interpretations, and vice versa.
211
See Butler and Johnston, 2010 Colum Bus L Rev at 86-87 (cited in note 35)
(arguing that the states should adopt the FTC's definitions of unfair and deceptive
practices because the current state approaches deter valuable information sharing by
sellers to consumers).
212
However, it is conceivable that many small businesses would not see the federal
standard as entirely applicable since the FTC primarily targets major frauds and would
be unlikely to investigate a small-time offender.
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more difficulty in avoiding UCL liability through new fraudulent
practices, unlike in a Cel-Tech regime. Businesses could then
reduce costs, leading to increased consumer welfare through
reduced prices.
Third, this uniformity improves enforcement of the UCL.
Namely, it helps courts, government agencies, and consumers
detect unfair practices because it is a clearer standard in
California law. Legal uniformity potentially benefits consumers
because businesses, armed with a clearer understanding of what
is "unfair" will face fewer costs from wasteful and inefficient
compliance efforts than with an unwieldy standard like the pre-

Cel-Tech rules.
2.

Arguments against the FTC § 5 test.

The § 5 test's potential weaknesses include: (1) potential
ambiguity compared to the Cel-Tech test; (2) absence of
dedicated enforcement agency like the FTC; (3) regulatory and
antitrust focuses; and (4) weakened consumer protections. First,
critics could argue that the § 5 test's second element perpetuates
the same amorphous balancing of a practice's utility as the preCel-Tech tests. This presents many of the same problems
previously addressed regarding the pre-Cel-Tech tests: increased
unpredictability, administrative costs, and frivolous litigation. 213
Some critics claim that the balancing test element is unguided
and, therefore, the test provides little useful instruction to the
courts. 214 The § 5 test thus presents some nebulous features
which may prompt risk-averse actors to overcorrect and not
engage in useful information disclosures. 215 In addition,
consumers may likewise have trouble separating the riskavoiders and "risk-preferers."2 16 Risk-averse sellers, those who
still provide useful and reliable information to consumers in the
face of uncertain liability, may also have trouble in signaling
their reliability and, thus, may face a competitive
disadvantage. 2 17 This unpredictable liability and incomplete

213
214
215
216
217

See Part III.A.2.
See Rice, 52 Geo Wash L Rev at 21-22 (cited in note 20).
See id at 56-57.
See id at 57-58.
See id at 58.
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enforcement could arguably drive "non-injuring risk-sensitive
competitors" out of the market. 218
However, as discussed above, the "significant" and "not
reasonably avoidable" injury requirements mitigate the
balancing element's unpredictability. 219 Even if it has some
chilling effect, the § 5 test is still a preferable middle ground
between the vague pre-Cel-Tech standard and the rigid Cel-Tech
standard. Engaging in this flexible normative evaluation of
business practices is necessary to target evolving commercial
exploitations.
Second, some authorities question the appropriateness of
applying the § 5 test, normally enforced by a dedicated agency
(the FTC), to determine the fairness of a business practice under
state law. 22 0 For example, a concurrence in Cel-Tech argued that
the § 5 test is inappropriate in private civil litigation because
the FTC's authority is based on its economic expertise and
investigative resources. 22 1 A state court, in contrast, lacks
comparable fact-finding capabilities. 2 22 Additionally, a defendant
faces greater liability from the UCL's restitutionary and
injunctive remedies than the FTC's cease-and-desist orders. In
essence, this argument claims that imposing the UCL's larger
liabilities distorts the § 5 test's original purpose to prohibit
current practices that, while causing harm that might become
unlawful anticompetitive practices, do not presently violate
antitrust law. 2 23
See Rice, 52 Geo Wash L Rev at 58 (cited in note 20) (citation omitted).
See Sawchak and Nelson, 90 NC L Rev at 2072-73 (cited in note 15); see also
Belt, 9-FEB Antitrust Source at 11-13 (cited in note 166) (arguing that the revised § 5
test "made the determination of unfairness both more clear and less clear: It made the
standard more clear by eliminating potentially ambiguous elements of the Cigarette
Rule standard; it made it less clear by requiring application of the balancing test in
every case").
220 See, for example, Belt, 80 Conn Bar J at 320 (cited in note 52).
221
See Cel-Tech, 973 P2d at 552 (Kennard concurring) (arguing the court should not
presume that the California legislature intended the UCL's predecessor law to
"incorporate the antitrust portion of § 5 of the FTC Act" and to reject the common law
definition of unfair competition). See also Federal Trade Commission v Keppel & Bro,
Inc, 291 US 304, 314 (1934) (explaining that the Commission is a uniquely qualified
because of its knowledge and experience with business and economic matters), quoting
Report of Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, S Rep No 597, 63d Cong 2d Sess 9,
11 (1914) (quotation marks omitted).
222 See Cel-Tech, 973 P2d at 553 (Kennard concurring) (noting the different ways
that state and federal unfair competition laws are enforced and California's lack of an
agency like the FTC).
2
Id ("The[] justifications for having an administrative agency search out incipient
218
219
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This argument overlooks important features of the § 5 test.
As noted, the § 5 test incorporates the balancing test as one
element of the court's evaluation of commercial fairness. 224 And
assuming that the courts lack the same economic expertise as
the FTC, providing the courts with greater guidance is a
significant improvement over the relatively unguided pre-CelTech definitions. 225 Similarly in a Cel-Tech regime, the courts
still face a disadvantage of relating potentially complex
transactions to established law. The FTC may have an
advantage over courts in evaluating business practices, but it is
unclear how the pre-Cel-Tech and Cel-Tech standards
meaningfully address the courts' disadvantage. California courts
fare better under the § 5 test because it focuses their attention
on clear exploitations-substantial consumer harms resulting
from coercive business practices.
Third, critics of the § 5 test claim that it overlooks the CelTech court and the FTC Act's focus on antitrust law and
competitor actions, not consumer protection law. 2 2 6 Some
commentators have argued that the Cel-Tech court's reference to
federal antitrust law for guidance makes less sense when the
case does not involve a denial of competitive position. 227 This
counterargument has some weight. Namely, the Cel-Tech court
clarified in footnote twelve that it expressed no view on the
application of federal unfair competition cases that involve
injury to consumers. 228 The Cel-Tech court's limited inquiry into
competitor actions, however, does not exclude the possibility
that the court would find the § 5 test appropriate to apply to
consumer cases. And perhaps more importantly, the § 5 test is
specifically geared toward consumer claims in its original use.2 2 9

antitrust violations and threats to competition before they have ripened into actual
antitrust violations do not support permitting private plaintiffs to do so in a judicial
forum.").
224
See 15 USC § 45(a). See generally Part I.A.
225
See Butler and Johnston, 2010 Colum Bus L Rev at 28-29 (cited in note 35)
("State courts are highly unlikely to exhibit the same degree of expertise in interpreting
statutory language as a specialized federal agency. Yet, many states seem to have
ignored this crucial difference and did not provide the courts and, perhaps more
importantly, businesses with needed guidance as to what constitutes an unfair or
deceptive practice.").
226
See Cel-Tech, 973 P2d at 542-44 & n 12.
227 See Wallenstein, Comment, 30 Sw U L Rev at 467-68 (cited
in note 181).
228 See Cel-Tech, 973 P2d at 544
n 12.
229 See Part
I.A.
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Fourth, opponents of the § 5 test could argue that its third
element-requiring that the consumer could not have
reasonably avoided the harm-greatly limits the UCL's
consumer protections. Critics may argue that this requirement
could have harsh results on consumers by introducing a
contributory negligence analysis. State attorneys general have
generally opposed adoption of the § 5 test, in favor of the
Cigarette Rule. 2 3 0 For example, California's Attorney General
has claimed that the § 5 test would make enforcement of
predatory business practices more difficult. 231 At first glance,
this seems like a valid concern. 232
However, criticism of the "not reasonably avoidable"
requirement is overstated. Courts have held that the "not
reasonably avoidable" test is not about the consumer's conduct
but about the options and information that the consumer had
during the underlying transaction. 233 Precedent further limits
this requirement by holding that consumers cannot "reasonably
avoid the injury" if they (1) could not reasonably anticipate the
injury; (2) lacked the means to avoid it, or (3) their "free market
decisions were unjustifiably hampered by the conduct of the
seller." 234
On the whole, the § 5 test has the best balance between the
predictability needed for effective administration of the UCL
and the flexibility needed for potent consumer protections in an
evolving market. While allowing the courts significant discretion
See Belt, 9-FEB Antitrust Source at 13 (cited in note 166).
Camacho, 142 Cal App 4th at 1403-05.
232 The Davis court rejected an unfair business practice
claim because the consumer
could have reasonably avoided the alleged injury. Davis, 179 Cal App 4th at 597-98. In
Davis, the business had a billing practice of applying the consumer's monthly payments
to any missed installments, rather than the current month's installment, resulting in
new late fees each time a delinquent consumer tried to pay the new month's installment.
Id at 585-86. The Davis court reasoned that the consumer could have reasonably
avoided the successive late fees by making his payments. Id at 598. This ruling is a
harsh result for indigent consumers because the business apparently took advantage of a
consumer's delinquency for its own benefit.
2
See, for example, Federal Trade Commission v Neoul, Inc, 604 F3d 1150, 1158
(9th Cir 2010).
234 See Camacho, 142 Cal App 4th at 1405, restating Orkin Exterminating Co, Inc v
Federal Trade Commission, 849 F2d 1354, 1365 (11th Cir 1988) (affirming the FTC's
finding that consumer injury was not "reasonably avoidable" when they have no reason
or means to anticipate the "impending harm"). The Eleventh Circuit's decision also
suggests that the Davis court may have been mistaken in finding the plaintiff could have
reasonably avoided the successive late payments considering the plaintiff may have
lacked the means to make his timely payments.
230
231
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to weigh a practice's social utility, the test also limits the
potential for abusive litigation, high administrative costs, and
uncertainty by requiring the harm to be "significant" and "not
reasonably avoidable." It also promotes uniformity between
state and federal law by adopting the definition under the
federal FTC Act.
IV. CONCLUSION

As in several states, California law is unsettled regarding
the appropriate definition of "unfair business acts and
practices." The California Supreme Court introduced a
heightened standard of unfairness for competitor cases, but
confusion remains over the appropriate definition in consumer
claims. Although I focused on the development of California's
unfair competition law, my analysis applies with near equal
force to other states' unfair competition laws. The shared
evolution from federal enforcement to state unfair competition
laws translates to uncertainty in the definitions used by many
states. As I argued in this Comment, the FTC § 5 test provides
the best compromise between consumer protection goals and a
sufficiently clear legal standard to optimally minimize
uncertainty, administrative costs, and abusive litigation.

